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the indictment; assuming, of course, that the indictment is well pleaded
and avers the legal crime to which the plea is directed.2
An extra-judicial confession, as distinguished from an infra-judicial
confession, is one which is made outside the court proceedings. The
admissibility of such a confession as evidence depends not upon to
whom it-was made but upon the manner in which it was obtained.3 A
confession to one in authority would not by that fact alone render the
confession inadmissible. However, the. trustworthiness of such a con-
fession must always be considered with regard to the relationship be-
tween the accused and the person of authority who claims that the
confession was made.4 Extra-judicial confessions are not limited to
signed confessions 5 or verbal admissions of guilt to persons of
authority,6 but such confessions also result from voluntary oral ad-
missions of guilt to other persons as well.7 Letters written between
the accused and another," and affidavits by the accused, though false,
stating that public funds had been properly entered on record 9 have
been held to be extra-judicial confessions.
It is well settled that an accused person cannot be convicted solely
upon his own uncorroborated extra-judicial confession,'0 and the cor-
roboration generally required must provide evidence that relates to
and tends to establish that the crime was committed." Evidence
aliunde the confession is generally held not to be such that must
establish the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt, 2 and the corpus
delicti need only be proved to the extent of the first two elements, since
-2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 587 (11th ed. 1935).
' 2 id. § 636.
'Ibid.
" Cryderman v. State, 101 Neb. 85, 161 N.W. 1045 (1917); State v. Wescott,
130 Iowa 1, 104 N.W. 341 (1905).
'Messel v. State, 176 Ind. 214, 95 N.E. 565 (1911); State v. Blay, 77 Vt. 56,
58 Atl. 794 (1904).
7 Egbert v. State, 113 Neb. 790, 205 N.W. 252 (1925).
8 Whomble v. State, 143 Neb. 667, 10 N.W.2d 627 (1943) (accused was
acquitted of charge of rape).
People v. Kay, 34 Cal. App.2d 691, 94 P.2d 361 (1931).
1 Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937); People v. Eding, 292
Mich. 46, 289 N.W. 324 (1939); Weller v. State, 150 Md. 278. 132 Atl. 624 (1926);
Sullivan v. State, 58 Neb. 796, 79 N.W. 721 (1899). Also see Note, 127 A.L.R.
1131 et seq. (1940), for an exhaustive collection of cases by jurisdiction.
1 Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937); State v. Jordan, 146
Ore. 504, 26 P.2d 558 (1933); Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 Pac. 1029 (1931);
Blacker v. State, 74 Neb. 671, 105 N.W. 302 (1905). For a collection of cases by
jurisdiction, see Note, 127 A.L.R. 1134 et seq. (1940). But see 7 Wigmore, Evi-
dence § 2071 (3d ed. 1940); Bunch v. People, 87 Colo. 84, 285 Pac. 766 (1930).
12 Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937); State v. Johnson, 95
Utah 572, 82 P.2d 1010 (1938); Sullivan v. State, 58 Neb. 796, 79 N.W. 721 (1899);
People v. Badgley, 16 Wend. 53 (N.Y. 1936) ("Full proof of the body of the
crime, the corpus delicti, independently of the confession, is not required by
any the cases; and in many of them slight corrobating facts were held suffi-
cient.").
NOTES
the third element, which is the identity of the accused as the perpe-
trator of the crime, has been established by voluntary confession.13 In
Nebraska and most jurisdictions the rules pertaining to extra-judicial
confessions are applied in all felony cases.14
The purpose of this article is to analyze and consider the merits of
the rule in Nebraska that only slight corroboration of extra-judicial
confessions is necessary to establish the corpus delicti.
The problem of determining what amount of corroborating evidence
is deemed to be sufficient between the point where there is a bare
confession without corroborating evidence and that which would
establish the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt is one which has
vexed the courts. Courts have held that such evidence is sufficient: if
it is clear and convincing;15 if it based on inconclusive facts and cir-
cumstances tending prima facia to show the corpus delicti;1 6 if it is but
slight evidence;17 if it establishes the corpus delicti to a probability or
if it is a preponderance of the evidence;1s or simply, if it is evidence
independent of the confession which does not necessarily and com-
pletely establish the corpus delicti.' 9 The evidence other than the con-
fession may be considered to be sufficient though making no reference
to the accused, and, when taken in conjunction with the confession, the
combined effect will sustain a finding of guilty although neither the
confession nor the evidence would alone be suffcient to produce such a
finding.2 0
Sullivan v. State is generally cited as the leading case establishing
the Nebraska rule regarding sufficiency of corroboration. In that case
the court stated "... . while a voluntary confession is insufficient stand-
ing alone, to prove that a crime has been committed, it is, nevertheless,
competent evidence of that fact, and may, with slight corroborative
circumstances establish the corpus delicti as well as the defendant's
guilty participation."'2 ' However, it is doubtful that the word "slight"
in the court's formulation of the rule is a true description of the
" 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2072 (3d ed. 1940). Professor Wigmore points out
that including the third element, i.e. the accused's identity, would be absurd,
since it would require that all three elements be proved independently of the
confession and thereby render the confession a nullity.1 Andersen v. State, 141 Neb. 306, 3 N.W.2d 447 (1942); Egbert v. State,
113 Neb. 790, 205 N.W. 252 (1925).
Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 Pac. 1029 (1931).
Hill v. State, 207 Ala. 444, 93 So. 460 (1922).
Gallegos v. State, 152 Neb. 831, 43 N.W.2d 1 (1950); People v. McWilliams,
117 Cal. App. 732, 4 P.2d 601 (1931). Also see State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 70
Pac. 1051 (1902); Heard v. State, 59 Miss. 545 (1882). But see State v. Guild,
10 N.J.L. 163 (1828).
"Pope v. State, 158 Miss. 794, 131 So. 264 (1930).
11 State v. Mabry, 324 Mo. 239, 22 S.W.2d 639 (1929).
212 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 640 (11th ed. 1935).
2- 58 Neb. 796, 799, 79 N.W. 721, 722 (1899) (emphasis added).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
evidence which was actually presented in the case for corroborative
purposes.
In this case Sullivan was heard to utter statements that he had
shot his best friend, and the court regarded such oral statements as
an extra-judicial confession. The only element sought to be provided
by the oral confessions plus the circumstantial evidence was that a
man had died as a result of criminal means. The corroborative
evidence relied upon to show this may be summed up as follows: first,
in an angered state of mind the defendant procured a revolver for the
expressed purpose of killing some person; second, the defendant had
the revolver in his possession at the time of the death of the deceased;
third, the defendant was in the vicinity at the time of the death;
fourth, there was a flash and report of a pistol; and, fifth, the de-
fendant returned with the revolver just after the flash and report, and
then hurried to the point where the body was lying.
Since the corpus delicti need not be proved beyond all reasonable
doubt where there has been an extra-judicial confession, the corrobora-
tion relied upon by the court would seem to stem from evidence which
was more than just "slight," if such word is to be given its ordinarily
defined meaning, that is, synonomous with "insignificance" or "unim-
portance. 22
It would seem that in none of the other cases reciting the rule that
only slight corroboration of the corpus delicti is necessary was there
evidence which could be regarded as being merely "slight.123
12 Funk and Wagnalls, New Standard Dictionary of the English Langauge
(1947).
"
3The cases of Whomble v. State, 143 Neb. 667, 10 N.W.2d 627 (1943);
Blacker v. State, 74 Neb. 671, 105 N.W. 302 (1905); Priest v. State, 10 Neb. 393(1880); Dodge v. People, 4 Neb. 220 (1876), are not helpful in determinnig
the sufficiency of corroboration required. In none of these cases was there
any corroborating evidence to establish the corpus delicti. Likewise, the cases
of Clark v. State, 151 Neb. 348, 37 N.W.2d 601 (1949); Anderson v. State, 141
Neb. 306, 3 N.W.2d 447 (1942); Cryderman v. State, 101 Neb. 85, 161 N.W. 1045(1917), are not helpful since in all of these cases the accused gave direct
testimony at the trial proceedings which substantiated the extra-judicial con-
fession.
In the following cases there was more than slight corroborative evidence
to prove the corpus delicti: Ashford v. State, 36 Neb. 38, 53 N.W. 984 (1893)(Accused, in a burglary prosecution, made on oral extra-judicial confession
admitting entrance of the house involved at 4 o'clock in the morning. There
was evidence to show that an entrance had been made, however, the conviction
was reversed and remanded due the statutory requirement that proof be made
that entrance took place during the night.); Davis v. State, 51 Neb. 301, 70
N.W. 984 (1897) (Accused, in a murder prosecution, made several oral ad-
missions that he had dislodged a rail on a railroad track which was the cause
of a train wreck in which several persons were killed. The proof showed the
rail to have been dislodged in a manner that required human force. Garments
of the accused were also found nearby.); Egbert v. State, 113 Neb. 790, 205 N.W.
252 (1925) (Accused, in a manslaughter prosecution, made several oral ad-
missions that he had shot his son-in-law. Daughter of the accused gave direct
NOTES
For exmple, Gallegos v. State24 was a case which squarely raised
the problem of sufficiency of corroboration. The accused was charged
with murder after he had made a detailed written confession of the
crime. In his confession he stated that a Mrs. Carrillo, not his wife,
had been living with him; that one night while arguing with her, he hit
her behind the left ear with a piece of stovewood; that she fell to
the floor, and blood formed a spot thereon; that she died as a result of
the blows, and on the next night he dug a grave near the house and
placed her body in it; that at the time he buried her she was wearing
a pair of his overalls, a lady's shirt, but no shoes; and that she was
wrapped in a blanket. The accused did not tell anyone of her death
until the confessions were made.
County authorities went to the place where he stated the body
was buried. They found a body which had been placed and clothed
as the accused had related. The body was partly decomposed, but it
was shown that it was the body of a woman of Mexican or Spanish
descent. The brown spot on the floor of the house was also found.
The court held that this evidence, taken together with the con-
fessions, was sufficient to establish the corpus delicti. Although the
body of Mrs. Carrillo was not proved by direct testimony, still, there
was strong circumstantial evidence that it was her body. Thus, the
first element of the corpus delicti was established when the evidence
was taken together with the confession.
It is rather doubtful that the accused could have been convicted
upon the evidence had he not made the confession, for it would seem
that such evidence would have left a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
Establishing the second and third elements of the corpus delicti would
have required proof beyond reasonable doubt. That being so, and
upon the facts presented, actual death by criminal means probably
could not have been established without more proof than the inefer-
ences which could be drawn. To link the identity of the accused with
the crime would also have required proof beyond reasonable doubt,
testimony which substantiated the confession.); Limmerick v. State, 120 Neb.
558, 234 N.W. 98 (1931) (Shortly after a car had been stolen, police authorities
saw the car and pursued it at a high rate of speed. After forcing the car to the
curb, the officers asked the accused, who was driving, where he had obtained
the car, and he stated that he had rented it from a man named "Blackie" at
an Omaha pool hall. The person referred to as "Blackie" proved to be a non-
existent person. The statements of the accused, though false, were regarded
as extra-judicial confessions.); Fisher v. State, 154 Neb. 166, 47 N.W.2d 349
(1951) (Accused, in a manslaughter prosecution, made statements to the
authorities that she had beaten her child to death. Upon examination of the
child by a doctor, it was shown beyond doubt that the child died as a result of
a violent beating, and that such injuries could not have been self-inflicted.).
2 152 Neb. 831, 43 N.W.2d 1 (1950), aff'd, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
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and such proof, on the facts presented, would appear to be lacking in
this case.25
As previously stated, the weight of authority holds that evidence
to establish the corpus delicti need not be proved entirely independent
of and without reference to the confession of the accused, but it may
be taken together with the confession to show guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. No doubt the theory behind this is that if the corpus
delicti is shown to exist, a sufficient trustworthiness appears in the
confession to link the confessor as the person committing the crime.
Hence, if proving death by criminal means is limited to a showing
that the death of the deceased actually resulted from a certain type
of an act, then the only evidence to support it in the Gallegos case
would be the brown spot or stain on the floor of the house, since no
mark or wound denoting violence was shown to exist on the body.
The peculiarities of the grave and manner of clothing of the deceased
would but raise inferences of criminal agency and would not actually
prove that death resulted from criminal means. Such a limitation of
the evidence would have, in this case as well as in the Sullivan case,
ruled out all inferences of criminal agency that could have been
drawn from the surrounding circumstances. However, the court in both
cases, in effect, held that evidence to prove the actual cause of death
is not necessary, and that resulting inferences from the surrounding
facts may also be used as circumstantial evidence. Therefore, it may
safely be said that in addition to the brown spot or stain on the floor,
inferences of criminality could reasonably be drawn from the nature
of the grave and burial, its location, the clothes on the body of the
deceased, and the failure of the accused to make inquiry of the where-
abouts of the deceased. Such corroborative evidence would appear to
be more than "slight."
The California case of People v. McWilliams26 illustrates a case
where a conviction for forgery and issuing a check without funds was
sustained although there was but slight corroborating evidence. It
was essential for the prosecution to show that the name of the drawee
was that of a ficticious person. To show that no such person as the
drawee existed, the court relied upon circumstantial evidence through
testimony of a witness who stated that he "checked the Fort Worth
[Texas] city directory for the years 1926 and 1930" and no such person
was listed. This, coupled with a confession, was suffcient evidence.
-r This case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the ground
that the confessions of Gallegos were made involuntarily, and, therefore, were
not admissible as evidence. It is important to note that had the-Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the decision on this ground, the facts of the
Gallegos case, as presented, would probably have been insufficient to a con-
viction without a confession.
211117 Cal. App.732, 4P.2d 601 (1931)r .
NOTES
The ruling of the McWilliams case indicated that the attitude of the
court was such as to give weight to even the slightest bit of evidence
which would provide at least some corroboration. This decision would
seem to be representative of one applying the slight corroboration rule
to evidence which was doubtlessly bare and inconclusive.
That there is a difference in degree as to the amount of evidence
regarded as being sufficient in the McWilliams case and that which
has been relied upon in the decisions of the Nebraska cases cannot be
doubted, even though both jurisdictions state the rule that slight
corroboration is sufficient.
It would seem that the Supreme Court of Nebraska has not been
confronted with a case which really invokes the "slight corroboration"
rule in its truest form. If the factual situations of either the Sullivan
or Gallegos cases are to be viewed as providing the measurement for
the rule regarding sufficiency of corroboration, the word "slight" seems
to be a misnomer. If, however, the court intends the word "slight" to
be accorded the meaning ordinarily given that word, the present state-
ment of the rule seems to be dictum, since it has never been necessary
to apply the rule to its fullest extent.
Policy Considerations Surrounding the Rule
The rule requiring corroboration of extra-judicial confessions, al-
though firmly established in American law, has been criticized as
being superfluous. There is no doubt that an ever present possibility
of false confessions of guilt does exist, and a rule to guard against
such confessions can be plausibly supported as a safeguard of the rights
of those whose hidden motives drive them to accept punishment de-
signed for the real criminal.
Perhaps just as plausible is the argument of Professor Wigmore;
that the danger to be safefuarded against is greatly exaggerated, since
the number of such confessions is exceedingly smallY.2  He also points
out that often unscrupulous lawyers resort to the rule as a legal sub-
terfuge from which to entrap the trial judge into an erroneous charge
to the jury.28 Both of these viewpoints assume that the confession
was given voluntarily. However, it would seem that the more obvious
danger, of false confessions made involuntarily, would provide the
more cogent argument in favor of the rule.
The report made in 1931 to President Hoover by the National Com-
mission on Law Enforcement 29 was the first nation-wide comprehensive
27 7 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 867, 2070 (3d ed. 1940).
2 Ibid.
"Nat'l Comm. on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness
in Law Enforcement (No. 11 June 25, 1931). The Report considered two topics:
(1) the third degree and (2) unfairness in prosecutions. The study of the third
degree methods was very compreheisive, and the important cities of every state
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study conducted to determine the existence and prevalence of police
third degree methods in the United States. The Commission concluded
that illegal third degree methods such as physical brutality, protracted
questioning, threats and illegal detention were employed by police
authorities throughout the country in order to obtain confessions or
statements.2 0 Since 1931, there has not been a comprehensive study
made with which to compare th present days conditions with those
existing at the time the Commission's survey was made. However, in
1946, the Committee on Civil Rights appointed by President Truman
reported that brutality in the extortion of confessions still existedY1
It was especially noted that the lawless methods were practiced against
racial and religious minorities with particular attention focused on the
treatment of Negroes in the South. Although steps have been taken
in many parts of the country to reduce these practices,32 it is readily
apparent that they still exist, thereby providing a sound basis for the
assumption that claims as to the prevalence of false confessions are
not as exaggerated as they were once thought to be. Fortunately,
modern police schools are being widely used by law enforcement
agencies in an effort to teach the use of more subtle and effective means
and the District of Columbia were analyzed for such practices. Twenty-two
types of unfairness in prosecution were mentioned, with reference made to all
states and the District of Columbia. It is interesting to note that from the
years 1926 to 1930, the investigators found approximately six hundred cases
involving such unfair practices.
" Nat'l Comm. on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Lawless-
ness in Law Enforcement 152, 153 (No. 11 June 25, 1931).3 The President's Committee on Civil Rights was appointed by President
Truman on December 5, 1946, to study and make recommendations for
strenghtening and improving "the civil rights of the people." The committee
was composed of fifteen distinguished citizens, headed by Mr. Charles E. Wilson,
then president of General Electric. This report embodied the Committee's
findings with respect to the status of the right to security of the person at the
end of 1947. The committee's appraisal may be taken as an authoritative, if
perhaps moderate, statement of the problem.
12 Many states have passed third degree statutes which make it a criminal
offense to illegally extort confessions from an accused person. Various punish-
ments include fines, jail or penitentiary confinement and removal from office.
Nebraska does not have a third degree statute in the sense that officials may
be punished for illegally extorting confessions, but under Neb. Rev. Stat. §
28-717 (Reissue 1948), if sheriffs, constables, coroners or jailers designedly,
wilfully or corruptly injure, defraud or oppress any person, they may be fined
in an amount up to $200, and also answerable to the person in treble damages.
And under § 23-2001 all county officers may be tried and removed from office
for "oppression." It is submitted that subjecting officials to fines and/or con-
finement for extorting confessions illegally is another reason why officials
would not as a rule admit their illegal acts when questioned about it during
the trial court's determination of whether the confession was voluntarily ob-
tained.
" For a discussion of the legal status of lie-detector test results and how the
lie-detectors is used in obtaining confessions, see Inbau, Lie Detection and
Criminal Interrogation 83-95 (2d ed. 1948).
", 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 822 (3d ed. 1940).
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of handling an accused person. Police science methods have utilized
the lie detector to great advantages today, and its usage has reduced
the extensiveness of coercive practices. 33
Judicial experience has provided the grounds for viewing confes-
sions in general with distrust, although no accurate statistics have
been tabulated on the number of untrue confessions.34 It is, however,
definitely settled that confessions extracted through physical violence,
promised immunity or other similar collateral inducements are in-
admissible. The majority of the jurisdictions regard the trial judge
as the one to determine the admissibility of a confession,3 although
recently there has been some movement to allow the jury to pass on
its admissibility. 3 But, before it is admitted, the trial judge must
hear evidence by the defense which goes to rebut the voluntariness. 37
Body scars or other physical marks on the accussed could provide
means by which the judge could properly determine that the confession
was illegally obtained. However, no such obvious clue of illegality Is
found when threats, promises and some forms of physical brutality
are used, and the resourcefulness of the trial judge in his deterinna-
tion becomes highly important. Persons of peculiar temperament,
defective mentality, unusual timidity, or those plainly ignorant of
their rights may chose to confess fairly readily rather than face the
consequences to which they would be subjected by remaining silent.
The Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement 3s concluded that
those employing these third degree methods will not, as a general
rule, admit their practices; and, further, that the victims are likely to
either exaggerate or fabricate their testimony or even remain silent
because of fear of police retaliation. 39 Thus, the trial judge can be
confronted with a situation where the prosecution attempts to admit a
confession which has been illegally obtained; and, when questioned
about its voluntariness, will strongly deny any coercive methods.
Just as strongly, the accused may make statements against its volun-
" State v. Wilson, 217 La. 470, 46 So.2d 738 (1950); Caudill v. State, 224
Ind. 531, 69 N.E.2d 549 (1946); State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178(1943); Rasin v. State, 153 Md. 431, 138 Atl. 338 (1927) (the admissibility
".... ought in all cases to be decided by the Court before the confession is per-
mitted to go to the jury."); Harris v. People, 55 Colo. 407, 135 Pac. 785 (1913).
1 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 861 (3d ed. 1940). Professor Wigmore is of the
opinion that this trend is improper as (1) it abolishes the true function of the
judge in his determination of questions of admissibility of evidence; (2) con-
fession rules are artificial and do not measure the ultimate value of the
confession; and (3) the jury is not familiar enough with the rules to attempt
to employ them.
"The jury may be withdrawn during the presentation of the proof; but
once the confession has been admitted, the weight and credence to be given it
is a question for the jury. See Wigmore, Evidence § 861 (3d ed. 1940).
" Note 31 supra.
' Nat'l Comm. on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness
in Law Enforcement 21 (No. 11, June 25, 1931).
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tariness in order to further his own ends. Since it would seem fairly
natural for the accused to attack the confession, the court cannot refuse
admittance merely on the pleas of the accused. The argument that
the accused has the right to introduce his own testimony to reduce the
weight and value of the confes-sion is one which would seem to be
adequate for that purpose and is no doubt a valuabl6 rule. However,
the fallacy in this rule is that it assumes that the testimony of one being
tried for a serious crime and who has apparently confessed to it is just
as honest as the testimony of the law enforcement officials, an assump-
tion which is contrary to public thinking regarding law enforcement
agencies. The trial judge is bound by the principles of his office to
make reasonable inquiry and investigation concerning a confession's
voluntariness. But when he is traveling a circuit or the docket becomes
burdened with forthcoming cases, his time may be taken up by other
important matters.
The point in the trial procedings when an extra-judicial confession
is to be ntroduced is within the discretion of the trial judge.4 0 Since
the corroborative evidence is so closely connected with the confession
and may be taken together with it to produce a finding of guilty, the
better practice would seem to be to determine the sufficiency of the
evidence before allowing the confession to be entered.4 1
Sufficiency, of Corroboration Required
Three categories of factual situations usually arise in applying the
corroboration rule (assuming that the corpus delicti to be proved con-
sists of the harm or injury and the criminal agency causing such harm
or injury). First, where the aliunde corroborating evidence alone has
no probative value as to guilt, since the evidence is just as consistent
with innocence, e.g,, A admits killing B by pushing B down a flight of
stairs, and the marks upon the body show that death resulted from
the fall. Second, where the aliunde corroborating evidence establishes
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when taken in conjunction with the
confession, e.g., A admits killing B by beating B to death, and the
evidence shows that death resulted from injuries which were im-
possible of being self-inflicted. Third, where the aliunde corroborating
evidence itself will establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without
the aid of the confession, e.g., A admits killing B with a revolver, and
C is an eye witness to the crime. Although cases seldom fall exactly
"Watts v. State, 229 Ind. 80, 95 N.E.2d 570 (1950) ("... the order of intro-
duction of this testimony is discretionary with the trial court."); Cooley v.
State, 233 Ala. 407, 171 So. 725 (1937); People v. Porter, 269 Mich. 284. 257 N.W.
705 (1934); Whitney v. State, 53 Neb. 287, 73 N.W. 696 (1898).
"
1Many juries today may even reject the confession after it has once been
admitted into evidence. See cases collected in 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 861
(3d ed .1940).
NOTES
within one of these categories, they usually take on characteristics
common to one of the three.4 2
The rationale behind the corrobration rule is simply to show that
a crime was committed. The problem is deciding to what degree the
evidence must show such a crime. Cases within categories two and
three establish the crime upon their facts and present the court with
little trouble. But a case having a factual situation from which a
prima facie inference of innocence can be drawn as well as one of
guilt squarely forces the court to decide upon some measure of
sufficiency of corroborating evidence. Regardless of the measure that
the court claims to be sufficient, its ruling is no doubt in some way
proportional to its trust for confessions in general.
Even though a jury may have the privilege of weighing the value
of a confession, as a practical matter, such a confession would have a
certain psychological effect tending to show guilt, even though the
defense might present strong argument to rebut its legality. No doubt
this is based, at least in part, upon the erroneous belief that law en-
forcement agencies only reserve rough treatment and trickery for the
guilty and not the innocent.4 8
CONCLUSION
Since judicial experience has provided some basis for a general feel-
ing of distrust for confessions, and since pretrial coercive methods
in obtaining confessions still exist today, it is submitted that the rule
requiring corroboration of an extra-judicial confession is one well
designed not only to protect the so-called exaggerated danger of
voluntary false confessions, but even more important, the danger of
involuntary false confessions.
The sufficiency of corroboration to be applied within a jurisdiction
should correspond to the general trustworthiness of confessions based
upon the common knowledge and experience accumulated by the court
system of the particular jurisdiction since the courts are in the best
position to view law enforcement practices within the jurisdiction.
The trial judge is the first line of defense against such coerced con-
fessions once they enter the channels of litigation. Any measure of
sufficiency so applied should be flexible in order to cope with any
coercive practices which become known to the courts.
It is common knowledge that certain religous and racial minority
groups have been and still are discriminated against, not only by mem-
bers of the general public, but by law enforcement officials as well.
"2 The third category could actually be excluded from the standpoint of
policy consideration regarding the need for the rule, since guilt could be
established without the aid of the confession.
," Nat'l Comm. on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness
in Law Enforcement 162 (No. 11, June 25, 1931).
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Where these practices are known to exist, courts which require small
and insignificant amounts of evidence -to corroborate the accused's
confession run the risk of creating a grievous injustice.
LAwRmcE L. WILSON, '55
